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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LLOYD F. vVEBSTER and CARL A.
\VJ£BSTER,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs.JOHN J. KNOP, WYCOTAI-I OIL &
URANIUM CO., a Corporation, DOUGLAS J. DAVIS, GRANT SHU1fvVAY,
JO"HN DOE, RICHARD ROE, FIRST
ROE,

Civil No. 8577

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINAHY STATEMENT
The appellants in this case are Grant Shumwa~~ and
Douglas J. Davis, who will be referred to either by name
or as defendants, and respondents, Lloyd F. Webster and
Carl A. Webster, will be referred to either by name or .as
plaintiffs. Other parties to the action, who are no longer
before this Court, will be referred to by nan1e.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
This appeal arises out of a suit brought by plaintiffs against defendant.s to adjudge the plaintiffs owners
of an undivided two-thirds interest in certain unpatented
lode mining claims as against any claim the defendants
1night assert thereto. The defendants, Shumway and
Davis, answered by denying plaintiffs' title in the properties and, by way of an affirmative defense, sought to have
the whole title to the Faith 11ining Claims quieted in
them. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendants, from which judgment
this appeal is taken.
It should be noted, the defendants, Shumway and
Davis, exert title only to the Faith ~fining Claims Numbers 1 through 10, and not to any other properties named
in plaintiffs' Complaint.

The plaintiffs assert an undivided two-thirds interest
in the Faith 1\lining Clanns, X u1nbers 1 to 10, located in
San Juan County, State of rtah. It is alleged that th8
plaintiffs and defendant, John J. l{nop, entered into a
grubstake agreen1ent, dated ~larch :23. 1954, and that
pursuant to this agreen1ent the plaintiffs, on or about
April 15, 1954, located the subject clain1s. Thereafter,
"acting under express agree1nent with the plaintiffs, the
defendant, John J. l{:nop, relocated said claiJ.ns on or
about the 14th day of ~\ugust, 1n3.r· (Con1plaint, par. 3).
By doing so the allegation is 1nade that l(nop was acting
for and in behalf of plaintiffs.
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The grubstake agreen1ent (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) provides as follows:
''This agreement entered into on the 23rd day
of March, 1954, by and between JOHN J. KNOP,
Moab, Utah, hereinafter referred to as FIRST
PARTY and LLOYD P. WEBSTER and CARL
A. vVEBSTER of ~Ioab, Utah, hereinafter referred to as SECOND PARTIES,
\VITNESSETII:
In consideration of the mutual covenants
and agreements herein contained it is agreed as
follows:
1. It is mutually agreed and understood that
SECOND PARTIES shall during the season of
April 1, 1954 through July, 1954 devote not less
than 50% of their time and energy to the prospecting of uranium, v.anadium and other valuable
minerals and deposits in the region known as the
Colorado Plateau in the States of Utah and Colorado and to locate, stake and record all discoveries deemed of sufficient value in the names of
FIRST and SECOND PARTIES and in no other
names.
2. It is mutually understood and agreed that
FIRST PARTY shall furnish to SECOND PARTIES during the term of this agreement, one (1)
jeep pick-up and one (1) jeep or similar vehicle
or any other vehicles which FIRST PARTY may
deem necessary and further that FIRSrr, PARTY
shall supply to SECOND PARTIES all necessary
food stuffs, fuel and tools necessary with the prospecting to be done hereunder, and provided however, that the cost of the aforesaid items of food,
fuel and tools shall not exceed $250.00 per month.
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3. It is furthermore specifically understood
and agreed that the FIRST PARTY shall advance
all of the costs of filing the aforesaid claims
whether filing as mineral claims or lease tracts
under the Atomic Energy Commission regulation
Circular 7.

-±. It is mutually understood and agreed
that all of the expenses of surveying shall also be
born 1;3 by FIRST PARTY and % by SECOND
PARTIES.
5. The FIRST PARTY to this contract shall
be deemed to own a lfa undivided interest and
SECOND PARTIES shall be deemed to own a
% undivided interest in and to the properties
staked pursuant to the terms hereof and shall
share any profits on the same basis.
6. The SECOND PARTIES covenant and
agree that they shall make no charge for time and
labor in performance of this contract except as
herein provided.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have set their hands the 23rd day of March,
1954.
jsj John J. l{nop
JOHN J. KNOP
FIRST PARTY
jsj Lolyd P. 'Yebster
LLOYD P. "\VEBSTER
jsj Carl A. 'Vebster
CARL A. WEBSTER
SECOND PARTIES
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STATE OF, UTAII
COUNTY OF GRAND

}
ss.

On the 23rd day of March, 1954, personally
appeared before me JOHN J. l(NOP, LLOYD P.
WEBSTER and CARL A. vVEBSTER, who being first duly sworn, acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.
Is/ A. Reed Reynolds
Notary Public, Res,iding in
Grand Cottnty
~Iy

Commission Expires :

~Iay

31, 1955"

It was stipulated at pre-trial between plaintiffs and
defendants, Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shun1way, that
a grubstake agreement was entered into between plaintiffs and John J. Knop on ~iarch 23, 1954 (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 1); that the Faith Claims were located on April
15, 1954, in the names of the three parties to the grubstake agreernent, and recorded on April 24, 1954; that on
.T uly 5, 1954, amended notices of location were placed on
the Faith Clairnfi, 1 and 2, and on August 10, 1954, amended location notices were placed on Faith Clain1s 3 to 10,
all such mnended notices naming the plaintiffs and defendant Knop as loc.ators, and were recorded on August
1~, 1954; that at the time of 1naking said original and
amended locations, the area covered by the ~-,aith group
was under an oil and gas lease in good standing; that
on August 14, 1954, the Faith Claims were located by
John J. Knop in his own name and recorded August
27, 1954; that a Quit-Claim Deed covering the Faith
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group from Wycotah Oil and Uranium Company, a defendant herein, was executed and delivered to the defendant, John fJ. Knop, on July 29, 1955; that on Julv
26, 1955, John J. Knop executed and delivered to th~
defendant, Douglas J. Davis, a Quit-Claim Deed to the
Faith group; both aforementioned Quit-Claim Deeds
were properly recorded on August 5, 1955. An Abstract
of Title was received as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.
In this regard, it was additionally stipulated at
trial that the defendant, John J. Knop, on August 1-1:,
1954, located the Faith Claims using then existing monuments and corners.
·upon the basis of the Complaint and the aforementioned stipulated matters and evidence, the plaintiffs rested their case upon the premise that such was
sufficient to establish that the location by John J. Knop
on August 14, 1954, was pursuant to an express trust
relationship, sufficient to establish a two-thirds interest
in the plaintiffs, .and that the defendants, Douglas J.
Davis and Grant Shunnvay, purchased s.aid Faith Claims
In bad faith and with notic-e of said interest.
vVithout adinitting nor conceding the existence of any
trust relationship whatsoever, the defendants Douglas
fJ. Davis and Grant Shun1way, testified regarding the
lin1ited question whether they were bona fide purchasers
for V1alue and without notice of plaintiffs· purported
equitable interest.
Grant Shumway testified In substance .as follows:
That he is a trained geologist and has entered into a
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general partnership with Douglas J. Davis for the purpose of locating and developing mining properties (R.
8) ; that he had occasion during the early summer of
1955, to go into the Elk Ridge area upon a prospeeting
expedition, and there discover the Faith group of claim::;,
ten in number (R. 9-10); that he walked the full length
and breadth of the claims to see that all monuments
and corners were properly marked; that he examined
location notices contained in two monument.s and found
that the claims were located in the name of John J.
Knop (R. 10-11, 22); that other pieces of paper appeared
in these monuments, but that they were illegible and
torn up (R. 10-11, 22, 23) ; that no development work
had been performed upon the property, although it
was apparent that the claims had been surveyed (R.
10-11); that as a result of this ex•amination he proceeded, together with Douglas J. Davis, to Monticello
where they attempted to locate John J. Knop (R. 11-12) ;
that he and Mr. Davis examined the records contained
in the Office of the County Recorder (R. 12-13); that
no grubstake agreement was found (R. 13); that he
had nothing to do with the negotiation for the purchase
of the Faith Claims; that he had no knowledge of any
grubstake agreement between John J. Knop .and the
plaintiffs herein; that he had no notice or knowledge of
any outstanding claim by or equitable interest in the
plaintiffs (R. 16); that the claims were purchased for
$500.00 apiece, which was a f.air and reasonable value
for undeveloped property in this particular area (R.
13-14); that subsequent to the purchase of the Faith
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group, a drilling contract was let and approximatelv
$3,000.00 worth of development work performed o~
the claims (R. 14-16); and, that a portion of the property was subsequently leased to third persons by the
defendants, Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway (R.
16). :Mr. Shumway further testified that sometime in.
the early part of September, 1955, in a Moab blueprint
office, Lloyd Webster introduced himself and inquired
whether Shumway knew that he, ""\Yebster, had an agreement whereby John J. Knop was supposed to pay $900.00
for the W ebsters' purported interest in the Faith
Claims (R. 16-17). Mr. Shumway testified that he had
no knowledge of such alleged interest. The witness
further stated that at a meeting during September, 1955,
Lloyd Webster advised him that he (""\Yebster) intended
to sue and he was sorry that Shumway and Davis were
involved because ·•,ye (Shun1way and Davis) didn't know
about it when we purchased the clailn.s" (R. 19).
Thereafter, the defendant, Douglas J. Davis, was
sworn and testified as follows:
That at the ti1ne of the purchase of the subject
Faith Claims, he was a partner of Grant Shun1way in
the general business of locating and developing 1nining
properties ( R. 31) : that he had occasion to go into the
Elk River .an'a to locate 1nining clain1s (R. 31-32): that
he found a group of claims located by John J. I~nop
(R. 32): that the na1ne "John J. I\::nop .. appeared on
the location notices exa1nined (R. 3~): that on the basis
1()\f this infonnation, he exmnined the I""eeords at the
Recorder's office in Monticello, and discovered three
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groups of location notices regarding the claims, the
latter in the name of John J. Knop and dated August
14, 1954 (R. 33); that he located John J. Knop, quite
by accident, and called him and arranged a meeting
to discuss purchase of the claims (R. 34); that a meeting was held between John J. Knop and Douglas J.
Davis approximately July 15, 1955 (R. 34) ; that the
witness was advised by Knop at said meeting that the
latter had entered into ,a.n agreement to sell the subject
claims to the defendant, Wycotah Oil and Uranium Company, but the deed had not been delivered (R. 34-35) ;
that Knop advised l\Ir. Davis that a possible arrangement could be worked out with \Vycot.ah whereby they
would relinquish their rights under the unexecuted contract to enable Mr. Davis to purchase the said group
(R. 37); that a day or so later a meeting was held with
jfr. Knop, wherein Mr. Knop showed Mr. Davis a survey
map of the Faith Claims (Defendants' Exhibit A) designating John J. Knop as the owner (R. 34-35); that at
this said meeting Mr. Knop explained that he located
the Faith Claims in his own name and in his own behalf,
.and that he had complete title to the property, unencumbered by any equitable interest in the W ebsters
(R. 36) ; that l\1r. Knop, at said meeting with Mr. Davis,
explained his pre-existing relationship with the Webster~,
st:ating that when the Faith Claims were originallY
located, the location was void for the reason the property
was situated on a valid oil and gas lease, and that the
grubstake agreeinent that had once existed between Knop
and the plaintiffs had terminated by its own terms when
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he relocated, and that in any event, it had been tenninated prior to that time because of disagreements arising
between the parties thereto (R. 36, 46-47, 48); that at
this meeting, Mr. Knop stated that his attorney, Robert
Gibson, had advised him that he (Knop) had complete
title and was free to convey said title to third persons
(R. 36); that at said meeting, no mention was made of
an agreement between the Websters and Knop dated
November 24, 1954, and pertaining to the Faith Claims;
that subsequent to the meeting with l\Ir. Knop on July
15, 1955, the witness went to Denver to discuss the
matter with Byron Xeid, an officer of Wycotah Oil
and Uranium Company, and at this meeting, the witness
inquired about title to the property and was informed
that attorney Robert Gibson had prepared an Opinion
on Title, which showed title to be in Knop (R. 36, 37);
that on or about July 26, 1955, he went to the office
of Robert Gibson at ~Ioab, rtah, together with John J.
Knop, where a Contract of Sale was prepared from
l{nop to Davis, and at said tune, a conversation was
had with l{nop .and Gibson regarding the title to the
property, and ~fr. Davis was told that l{nop had "good~'
title (R. 38-40); and that prior to going to Denver,
Colorado, the witness consulted Scott ~I. ~Iatheson, Jr.,
Attorney at Law, in Salt Lake City. rtah, regarding
the effect of the loeations by the 'Yehsters on April
15, 1954, over an existing and valid oil and gas lease,
and was advised that in his opinion such locations were
void, and was further advised that title to the subject
property appeared to be in John J. l{nop based upon
the locations dated August 14, 1954 (R. 4-!).
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It was stipulated by .and between the parties hereto
that if Robert Gibson, Attorney at Law, were called
a.s a witness, he would testify in substance that he prepared a title opinion on the Faith Claims, which opinion
showed title to be in John J. Knop (R. 54-55). It was
further stipulated that if Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Attorney at Law, were called as a witness, he would testify
that he was consulted by Douglas J. Davis regarding
the Faith Claims, and that he advised Mr. D.avis that
title to said claims appeared to be in John J. Knop,
inasmuch as the earlier location and amended loc.ation
was upon a valid oil and gas lease, and prior to the
effective date of Public Law 585.

Lloyd Webster testified that he gave no one
authority to sell the Faith Claims (R. 56).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
'THE COMPE·TENT EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH 'THAT JOHN J. KNOP
LOCATED THE FAITH CLAIMS PURSUANT TO AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 'TRUST AGREEMENT OR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLAINTIFFS.
POINT II.
WHERE VOID MINING CLAIMS ARE ATTEMPTED TO
BE STAKED DURING 'THE EXISTENCE OF A GRUBSTAKE
AGREEMENT, A PARTNER, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING, MAY SUBSEQUENTLY LOCATE THE SAME CLAIMS AF'TER THE
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND FOR HIS OWN BENEFIT.
1
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POINT III.
EVEN ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY, THAT THE
FAITH CLAIMS WERE LOCATED PURSUANT TO A TRUST
REL.A:TIONSHIP VESTING AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN
THE PLAINTIFFS, STILL THE DEFENDANTS, DOUGLAS
J. DAVIS AND GRANT SHUMWAY, TOOK TITLE AS BONA
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE.
POINT IV.
ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY, THE EXISTENCE OF
A VALID TRUST AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS, UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN THE
INSTANT CASE, THE PLAINTIFFS MUST LOOK FOR
THEIR REMEDY TO THE TRUSTEE.
ARGU~IENT

POINT I.
THE COMPETENT EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH THAT JOHN J. KNOP
LOCATED THE FAITH CLAIMS PURSUANT TO AN EXPRESS OR IMPLIED TRUST AGREEMENT OR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PLAINTIFFS.

In the instant case, there is no argument against
the proposition that the original location of the Faith
group was upon land subject to the n1ineral Leasing
Art of 1920, and was "·holly invalid and void for all
purposes. This location was void as between the locators
and the govern1nent, and also .as to third parties acquiring rights in the land ( ll en rickson r. California
Talc ConlJWH.If, (Cal. 19-t-2) 130 P. :2d 806). It follows
there ean be no possession where the clain1 is void
because .. a location to be effectual 1nust be good .at the
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time it is made" (Beek v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279). Likewise, there can be no "relocation" in the absence of a
prior valid location (Ibid).
It mu.st be agreed the original location w.as defective
and absolutely void, leaving only the location by John
J. l{nop of August 14, 1954, as the sole location upon
the subject property. Moreover, it should be pointed
out that the invalidity of the purported originrallocation
is not based upon minor technical defect, e.g., improper
monuments or lack of discovery, but is based upon a
conceded inability to place any mining claim whatsoever upon the property.
It is submitted that when John J. Knop located
the subject mining claims, he did so in his own behalf,
and did not thereby create in plaintiffs any beneficial
or equitable interest in the property.

Signific.antly, the Complaint alleges in Paragraph
3 that the subject mining claims were located by John
J. l{nop acting pursuant to an "express agreement"
with the plaintjffs. It is apparent from the evidence
that it is wholly devoid of the slightest showing of
proof that any express agreement was entered into between plaintiffs and John J. l{nop, charging the latter
with the responsibility of locating the Faith Claims
for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The allegation itself
clearly purports to mean the creation of a trust relationship based upon n1utual understanding and with the
intention of the p.arties. The absence of any evidence
supporting this theory is manifest; indeed, had plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tiff.s sought to prove its case on the theory of an express
trust relationship, they are confronted with the Statute
of Frauds, which provides that an interest in real property thereby created must be evidenced in writing. (Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
Despite the allegation of an "express agreement,"
which has wholly failed of proof, the Court determined
that principles of equity created in plaintiffs an interest
to the disputed mining claims, because John J. Knop
used monuments erected by plaintiffs upon land explored by plaintiffs previously-. This, coupled with the
evidence supplied by the grubstake agreement, further
created a relationship of mutual trust and confidence,
according to the Court. This conclusion presumably is
reached upon the theory of a trust implied in law, i.e.,
a resulting trust; although not explicitly raised nor
discussed by plaintiffs or the trial court.
A resulting trust arises where a person makes or
causes to be made a disposition of property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend
that the person taking or holding the property should
have the beneficial interest in the property (3 ScoTT
oN TRusTs ( 1939 Ed.) ·~-1:041). A resulting trust, unlike
an express trust, is based upon rule, presumption or
inference of law and not an expression of intention by
the trustor ( 5-! AM. J uR., 1,rusts. §187). Both express
and i1nplied trusts involve intention to create a trust,
but in the case of a resulting trust the intention is implied or presumed in law, the chief source of such implication or presu1nption being a valuable consideration
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(5-± AM. JuR., Trusts, §194). This rule is well stated
in -± Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th Ed.) § 1031,
as follows:
"***The equitable theory of consideration,
*** is the source and underlying principle of the
entire class ****. In such case a trust is implied
or results in favor of the person for whom the
equitable interest is assumed to have been intended, and whom equity deems to be the real
owner. This person is the one from whom the
consideration actually comes, or who represents
or is identified in right with the consideration;
the resulting tru.st follows or goes with the real
consideration."
To establish a resulting trust, plaintiffs must prove not
only that they furnished money for acquiring the property but that the money or the consideration was in
fact so applied. (Brown v. Liken (N.M. 1933) 22 P. 2d
848); See lJicDennott li. Sher (N.J\L 1955) 280 P. 2d
660).
Grubstake agreements, whether giving rights in
trust relationships, or being enforced by their own
terms, must be treated in like manner as other contracts,
and must be supported by satisfactory proof of all the
essential elements-especially con.sideration ( 40 CoRPUS
JuRis, J\1:ines, page 1154; see Cisna v. Mallory, (C.C.
Wash. 1898) 84 Fed. 851). 3 Lindley on Mines (3rd
Ed.) §858, places emphasis upon ordinary contract requirements, stating as follows:
"Should the prospector during the life of the
contract locate in his own name to the exclusion
of the one supplying the capit al, the title thus
1
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accruing to him would be held in trust for his
associate in the joint venture to the extent of his
interest, not necessarily on the theory of partnership, but for the reason that his advances contributed to the acquisition of the property.~'
(Citing Meylette v. Brennan, 20 Colo. 2-!2, 38
Pac. 75; Byrne v. Knight, 12 Cal. App. 56, 106
Pac. 593, 594; Lockhardt v. Leeds, 195 lr.s. -±27,
25 S. Ct. 76).
The burden rests on the plaintiffs to establish a
fiduciary relationship essential to create the purported
trust (Renshazr L Tracy Loan & Trust, 87 r. 359, 35
P. 2d 298, modified 49 P. 2d 403; Botkin 1:. Pyle (Colo.
1932) 1-± P. 2d 187; Jl,faynard 1:. Taylor (Okla. 1939)
91 P. 2d 649; Zioncheck v. Xadeau (V\Tash. 1938) 81 P.
2d 811). The e·vidence sustaining a resulting trust in
real property n1ust be clear, convincing, definite, unequivocal, and not conflicting on material points, as to
the agreement or understanding upon which the property was obtained. (See 89 C.J.S., Trusts, §137; Chambers v. Emery, 13 F. 37-+. 45 Pac. 19~: .l-Iansen r. Hansen, 110 TT. 272, 171 P. 2d 39~). It is subnlitted that
the evidence wholly f.ails to support this burden. The
trust agree1nent, whether expre~s or ilnplied, alleged
to exi ~t between the plaintiffs and l{:nop, could onl~
have one evidentiary source - the grubstake agTe~·
Inent. \VhPn th i~ agree1nent is strictly construed, the
following factors are apparent:
1. The grnhstnkP agree1nent 1nakes no reference
to .nn~· trn8t obligation of the defendant l(nop.
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:2. The grubstake agreen1ent had ended by its tenns
(July, 1954) prior to the date of the first valid location
of the Faith Claims.
3. The grubstake agree1nent provided expressly that
the Websters were to locate all n1ining claims pursuant
to the contract.
-!. The .agree1nent provided that John J. Knop was
only to supply the grubstake.

The most significant aspect of the grubstake agreement i.s the complete absence of any obligation on Knop's
part to locate the Faith Claims or any other claims
on behalf of the plaintiffs. The outstanding mining
authority, 3 Lindley on Mines (3rd Ed.) § 858, states
that it is essential to a right in property under a grubstake contract that such property be acquired by means
of the grubstake furnished pursuant to such contract.
Again in 40 Corpus Juris, Jl;fines, at page 1154, it is
stated that equity will not enforce a trust in a 1nining
claim located hy an alleged partner under a contract
to do so, when the claim was in fact, not located with
partnership capital. (Craw v. Wilson, 22 Nev. 385, -10
Pac. 1076).
It is apparent frmn the grubstake agreement that
.John ~J. Knop was free to locate claims as he wished
and in his own behalf without being required to account
to the plaintiffs for such property (See Kahn v.
Smelting Company, 102 U.S. 641).
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Setting aside for the moment the grubstake agreement, an examination might be made of the other evidence to seek an implied intention to create the purported trust. We find that Knop employed the corners placed
on the ground by plaintiffs. These were doubtless
changed with survey. This feature alone remains the
on]~· peg upon which a trust relationship could arguably
be based; but, this single factor does not constitute clear,
convincing, definite and unequivocal evidence of the
quality and quantity sufficient to create a trust in real
property (Chambers 1.:. Emery, Supra; Hansen 1.:. Hansen, Supra). It is hardly .sufficient to show, as plaintiffs aver, that Knop located the Faith Claims acting
pursuant to the intention of all the parties. It does not
follow by any exercise of the imagination that Knop was
charged with any duty subsequently to locate the claims
on behalf of hin1self and the plaintiffs. X or, indeed, can
implication and conjecture supply a causal relation between l{nop's location and the prior agreement and acts
perforn1ed thereunder.
POINT II.
WHERE VOID MINING CLAIMS ARE ATTEMPTED TO
BE STAKED DURING THE EXISTENCE OF A GRUBSTAKE
AGREEMENT, A PARTNER, IN THE ABSEN.CE OF ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED UNDERSTANDING, MAY SUBSEQUENTLY LOCATE THE SAl\IE CLAIMS AFTER THE
TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND FOR HIS OWN BENEFIT.

'rhi.s is not the case wlu:~re co-tenants of re·al property
enter into a rPlationship of trust, one to the other, so as
1o pn'(·lwh~ one co-tenant fr01n g.aining son1e advantage
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with respect to the joint property over his co-tenant;
nor where joint tenants are acting in hostility with reference to the joint estate; nor where one of several joint
owners of mining claims has sought to amend the location
to his own benefit, to secure a patent for his own benefit,
or to relocate the clai1n for his own benefit (See Speed v.
JllcCarthy (S.D.) 77 N.vV. 590; Kline v. Wright (D. C.
I d. 1930) -t2 F. 2d 927; Yarwood v. Johnson, et al., 29
'Vash. 643, 70 Pac. 123; Henrickson v. California Talc
Co., (Cal., 1942), 130 P. 2d 806).

None of the evidence produced by plaintiffs in this
case tends to show that John J. Knop located the Faith
Claims pursuant to an express or implied agreement with
plaintiffs, nor during the existence of any grubstake or
prospecting .agreement. Paramount consideration should
be given to the following uncontradicted evidence fortifyjng the allegation of defendants, Shumway and Davis,
that the claims were located by ICnop as his own property
and free fr01n any entanglement with plaintiffs: 1) The
Faith group located by John J. Knop, alone, and in
his own name; 2) The claims were located after the termination of the grubstake agree1nent; 3) This location was
achieved by the use of Knop's own money, tin1e and effort; -l) The claims were surveyed by Knop and at his
expense; 5) The claims rem.ained on the County records
as Knop's sole property; and, 6) Knop held himself out
to the world as the sole owner and conveyed title as such.
Each of these unrefuted items belies and negatives the
allegation that the claims were located on behalf of the
plaintiffs. The only direct .and substantial evidence beSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fore the Court showed Knop to be the locator and the
owner of the whole interest in the real property. If the
facts are otherwise they were not produced by plaintiffs.
40 Cor pus Juris, IV! ines, page 1155, makes express
reference to our precise fact situation, stating:
"It is essential to a right in property under a
grubstake contract that such property should be
acquired by means of the grubstake furnished and
pursuant to a grubstake contract, [Citing cases],
as well as during its existence ... " (Emphasis
supplied.)
The en1phasized portion of the foregoing is mnply footnoted by authorities holding that where there has been no
concealment, discoveries by individual nwmbers of a
fonner prospecting partnership (grubstake agreement)
are not partnership property, although made on grounds
prospected during its existence (Re Laidley (1910) :JI.C.
1
( •
-!-78) : and e.ases holding that where claims staked
during the existence of a prospecting partnership turn
out to be invalid and are canceled or lapsed, one of the
partner:-: who subsequently res takes the san1e after the
ter1nination of the partnership, and 1naintains and protects them solely by his O\Vn labor and n1oney. is entitled
to the entire interest therein (Be Libby, (1909) :JI.C.C.
-t--tl; Rc SC,lfm')lfr~ (1909) ~I.C.C. -t~l: Re Greene. (1908)
1\l.C.C. :2:2:n. The rule is state(l dearly in Iiolliugs1forth
v. Tuft.-.·. ():2 Colo. :25G, lG:2 Pac. 155, 159, as follow~:
"The law is well settled that the partnership
relation between the parties engaged in acquiring
1nining properties for their joint benefit n1nst exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ist at the ti1ne such properties .are acquired by one
of the parties to such an arrangement to entitle
the other to an interest therein."
ln Morrow v. Coast Land Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 92,
84 P. :2d 301, it wa.s held in an action by claimants against
an oil well driller, that although the clain1ants and the
driller had entered into a prospecting ~agreement with
respect to the land in question, and had even commenced
drilling for oil, but had subsequently stopped work and
allowed the agreement to terminate, that the driller was
entitled to obtain a pennit in his own name, and that
claimants were not entitled to share therein.
And, in Bradley v. Andrews, 91 Colo. 378, 14 P. 2d
1086, the claimants were to supply money and defendant
was to prospect and locate oil leases. The claimants
failed to supply the money and defendant called the contract off. Later the defendant interested a third party
in the leases and the claimants attempted to exert a onehalf interest. It was held that before any person who
supplies 1noney, etc., may share under .a prospecting
(grubstake) agreement, the property n1ust have been
acquired during the life of the agreement. In that case,
the leases were acquired after the contract expired. The
Court .added further:
" ... When the contract was terminated both
parties were free to proceed as they saw fit.
Bradley availed hi1nself of his opportunity; Andrews neglected his. Now that Bradley, after an
expenditure by him .and his new associate of considerable time and money, is reaping the fruits of
his industry, Andrews seeks to take away from
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Bradley, a substantial part thereof. He ought not,
and under law he cannot succeed in this attempt."
In a similar case, the plaintiffs and defendants entered into a prospecting agreement to acquire mining
claims, and each of the parties was to share equally.
One of the defendants and a party plaintiff located two
mining properties within two weeks of a subsequent
agreement mutually to abandon and dissolve the prospecting agreement. Seven days after the termination
of the agreement the defendants and one of the plaintiffs
relocated the same claims and erected proper monuments.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs by their action sought to have
defendants conYey to then1 their alleged interest in the
property, contending that the partners oceupied a fiduciar~- relationship to one another, that the subsequent
location, after the dissolution of the agreement, should
be treated as a cmnpletion of the prior attempted locations, and that a trust should be imposed in their favor.
The court rejected the contention of plaintiffs, concluding
that defendants wen' not trustees. When the parties
nmtually agreed to dissolve the agreen1ent, and having
done ~o, the plaintiffs n1ight be concluded to ha\e abandoned all interest in the property. The court further
pointed out that uo duty re1nained when the agreement
wa~ t<>rminatPd to con1plete .any locations. and that plaint j l'f~ ( otlJpr than tlH' one who joined in the subsequent lo<·at ion~) could not be cmnpelled to accept a conveyance
nor could they be charged with the expenses of location
( J>apc. rt a!. v. Summers, ct a!. ,70 Cal. 1:?1. 1:? Pac. 1:20:
~<'<' alfio .Jeuuin.rf·"' Y. Riclwrds, 10 Colo. ~)~);), 15 Pac. (1/1.
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where the court refused to create a trust in mining property prospected during life of agreement and located by
one party after the termination of agreement).
The instant case is not unlike the above-cited authorities. The grubstake .agreement between plaintiffs
and defendant, Knop, had clearly tenninated when the
latter placed the only good and valid location upon the
Faith properties. Plaintiffs and Knop were free to proceed as they wished. No residual duties remained according to the proof. nloreover, there is nothing to show that
Knop did not act in the uhnost good faith when he located
the properties and recorded the same for public scrutiny
and inspection. And, again, it must be rea.sserted for
the unmistakable and affirmative weight of the fact,
that no substantial advances of the vVebsters contributed
to the acquisition of the property. The law treats interests in real property with the greatest circumspection
and caution, and will not allow a claim therein to be premised on speculation and conjecture, and especially will
not sanction the creation of a trust in real property upon
evidence which is not clear, convincing, definite, unequivocal, and which is conflicting on material points. The
rule which forbids a co-tenant from acquiring and asserting an adverse title against his companions because of the
mutual trust and confidence which is supposed to exist
can have no application where the facts show that no cotenancy ever existed in the property and the locator acted
only in conformity with federal law to secure an interest
in the disputed property (liodgson v. Federal O·il & Development Co., 274 U.S. 15, 71 L. ed. 901,47 Sup. Ct. 502).
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POINT III.
EVEN ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY, THAT THE
FAITH CLAIMS WERE LOCATED PURSUANT TO A TRUST
RELATIONSHIP VESTING AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN
THE PLAINTIFFS, STILL THE DEFENDANTS, DOUGLAS
J. DAVIS AND GRANT SHUMWAY, TOOK TITLE AS BONA
FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE.

It unifonnly has been held that a bona fide purchaser
for value fro1n a trustee holding under an in1plied trust,
and without notice, takes free of any equities in the beneficiary of the trust (Peterson v. Peterson, 112 -ctah 554.
190 P. 2d 135). Stated differently~ anyone to whom propC>rty is transferred in violation of the trust holds the
property as an involuntary trustee under such trust, unless he purchased it in good faith and for valuable consideration (Sampson Y. Bn~:der (Cal. 19-±1) 118 P. 2d ~8:
see also Rafftery v. Kirkpatrick (Cal. 1938) 85 P. 2d
1-1-7). In this regard it has been held, in a California decision, that a person who purchases a nrining claim in
good faith and for a yaluable consideration is not responsible to plaintiff ·who has rights under a grubstake
agreement (1\.imlwll v. San Francisco Superior Court.
3R Cal. App. 7f)l. 177 Pac. 488).
It might be asked: Does the f.act that defendant

Davis took a Quit-Clai1n Deed frmn John J. Knop put
hi1n on notice that there 1nay be unrecorded instru1nents
or agTPC'nwnts effecting title or constituting encumbnuw<'s on the pro pert~-~ The Supre1ne Court of the
I 'nih,d ~tatPs in Jloelle ,-.Sherwood, 1-t-S r.~. :21.13 S. Ct.
-!:2(i, -+:2!), has :1 nswered pia in I~- in the negatiYe, as follows:
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"There is in this country no difference, in
their efficacy and operative force, between conveyances in the form of release and quitclaim, and
those in the form of grant, bargain and sale. ***
If in either case the grantee takes the deed with
notice of an outstanding conveyance of the prenlises by the grantor, or of the execution by him of
obligations to make such conveyance of the premises, or to create a lien thereon, he takes the property subject to the operation of such outstanding
conveyance and obligation, and cannot claim protection against them as a bona fide purchaser.
But in either case, if the grantee takes the deed
without notice of such outstanding conveyance or
obligation respecting the property, or notice of
facts which, if followed up, would lead to .a knowledge of such outstanding conveyance or equity,
he is entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser upon showing that the consideration stipulated has been paid, and that such consideration
was a fair price for the claim or interest designated. The mere fact that in either case the conveyance is unaccompanied by any warranty of
title, and against encumbrances or liens, does not
raise a presumption of the want of bona fides on
the part of the purchaser in the transaction."
·rhi:-~

r.ase disaffinned prior decisions stating that a quitrlaim grantee could not be a bona fide purchaser. See
also to this effect, Aitken v. Lane (l\Iont. 1939) 92 P. 2d
628.
Certainly, under the facts presented in the instant
case no notice could be considered to flow frorn the rnen~
existence of an unrecorded grubstake agreernent defining
rights of the parties thereto. Frorr1 the undisputed eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dence presented on behalf of defendants, Davis and
Shumway, it is equally apparent that they had no knowledge that the plaintiffs had or were exerting any interest
in the Faith Claims, arising from the earlier grubstake
agreement. There remains, but a single factor upon
'"'hich plaintiffs rely to rebut the overwhelming and preponderant evidence of good faith and purchase without
notice-the recordation of patently void location notices.
As a general proposition, one who deals with real
property is charged with notice of what is shown by the
records of the County Recorder of the county in which
the property is situated (Crompton v. Jenson, 78 r. 55,
10, 1 P. 2d 2-12). However, a purchaser need not take
notice of recorded instrmnents not in his chain of title
(-+Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,§ 893, n. S:Z: Smitlz \.
"~illiams, (Okla. 1928) 269 Pac. 1067). So, here, it can
properly be argued that the location notices recorded
prior to the effective date of Public. Law 585 and showing
the clai1ns to be on valid oil and gas leases were wholly
voi<l and invalid and completely outside the ehain of title
in tlH' Faith Clain1s.
This proposition is buttressed in the light of the genPral principal that ·'the record of a Yoid instrument is of
no <' ffeet wl1a 1~opver... (-I-~) .-\~1. J rR .. Record and Re('Ording Law~.~ Hl;J ). It i~ stated further:
"No l<>gal rffpet i:s produeed upon the rights
of the pa rtiP~. or of subsequent purchasers or
<'ll<'lllllhranet>r~. h~- the reeording of a void in~trmuenL ,..* .. (-l-5 Al\r. JFR .• Supra. Section 106).
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In ~llosley v. 1lfagnolia Pet1·oleu1n Co. (N.l\L 1941) 114
P. 3d 740, it is stated:
"Only valid instrun1ents are authorized to be
filed and recorded, of which purchasers are
charged with notice.''
In an Idaho decision, where a deed executed by grantor's
attorney in fact was recorded prior to the filing and
recording of the power of attorney, it was held that although this did not necessarily render the deed void
as between the parties, it did not constitute notice to subsequent purchasers of the land (Hunt v . .ZII[ cDonald (ld.
1944) 149 P. 2d 792). The Court stated in IJ;Iadden v .
.Alpha Hardware & Supply Co., (Cal. 1954), 274 P. 2d
705, 707:
"It is true that recordation of an instrument
is constructive notice of the contents thereof to
subsequent purchasers, and that such knowledge
is conclusive; however, this rule contemplates
only conveyances by one having leg,al title to the
property involved. *** the two quitclaim deeds
which Cassidy subsequently negotiated, each of
which was void on its face, could not affect the
title, and gave no notice to anyone."
In our case the only valid instruments were recorded
by John J. Knop. In this regard Section 57-1-6, UTAH
ConE ANNOTATED, 1953, provides as follows:
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every
instrument of writing setting forth an agreement
to convey any real estate or whereby any real
estate may be .affected, to operate as notice to
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and
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recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, bnt shall
be valid and binding between the i)arties thereto
without such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or record, and as to all other persons wh~
have had actual notice. :K either the fact that an
instrun1ent, recorded as herein provided, recites
only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the
grantee in such instrun1ent is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports
to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or
stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to
charge any third person with notice of the interest of any person or persons not named in such
instrument or of the grantor or grantors; but the
grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument
free and clear of all claims not disclosed by the
instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein
provided setting forth the nan1es of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest."
Thi;;; portion of our Code precludes an)~ notice of third
part~- equities arising frmn the recordation of the ~\ugnst
1+. 10;)-1-, location h~- John J. I~nop. the purported trustee.
Di~r0garding,

for tlw nlmnent, the clear ilnport of
the accepted dnctrine of law regarding notice afforded
hy Yoid instrunwnb, and assn1ning that a grubstake
:1 '"T<'<'IIH'n
t wa~ Oil<'<' known bv
""""
. defendants to exi8t, vet
. the
<l<'f<>ndnnt~. D:n·i~ and Slnunway. acted in good faith,
emplo~·<'d dtw dilig<'llet>, and acquired title as bona fide
pur<·hn~<'r~ for Y.n hw. 'rhe following indicia of good
l'nith supplied by the evidence exe1nplif~- this result:
.
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1)

11he defendants went upon the ground and
walked the entire area of the clain1s, and determined they were located by John J. Knop.

2)

The exan1ination of the property revealed
that plaintiffs were not in possession, nor
had they performed development work.

3)

The defendants examined the record entries
at the office of the County Recorder and deterrnined that the only valid location was in
the name of John J. Knop, alone.

-!)

The defendant Davis 1nade complete inquiry
of Knop regarding the latter's title and was
advised that he (I{nop) located the claims in
his own behalf and that there were no outstanding equitable interests in third persons.

;) )

The defendant Davis made inquiry of Robert
Gibson, Attorney at Law, and was advised
that a title opinion had been prepared by him
pertaining to the Faith Claims, and that John
J. l{nop had a good and unencumbered title.

6)

The defendant Davis made inquiry of Scott
l\L :Matheson, Jr., Attorney at Law, and was
advised that the prior mining locations on
valid oil and gas leases were void and that
.John J. Knop appeared to have valid title.

7)

The defendants paid a reasonable consideration for the Faith Claims.

8)

The defendants, after making the foregoing
exhaustive inquiry, and after purchasing the
property for a substantial consideration, then
went upon the land and spent considerable
additional sums for drilling and development.
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One of these factors standing alone might be deemed insufficient to constitute diligence, but when each is considered it is apparent that the defendants Davis and
Shu1nway exerted every reasonable effort to ascertain
the true condition of the title, and only after the exercise
of a plethora of caution they proceeded to acquire the
deed from John J. Knop. To deny this title would be a
grossly unfair penalty for unusual, persevering and
laudable diligence.
If the facts are as plaintiffs allege, they prejudiced
their standing in this 1natter by failing to make the slightest effort to correct the public records so as to protect
innocent third persons against deception and reliance
thereon. That this was not done shows how tenuous their
clai1n must be.
POINT IV.
ASSUMING, arguendo ONLY. THE EXISTENCE OF
A VALID TRUST AGREEMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS, UNDER THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN THE
INSTANT CASE, THE PLAINTIFFS ~IlTST LOOK FOR
THEIR REMEDY TO THE TRUSTEE.

\ rherp a trn~t<'C'. holding under a deed absolute on its
conn'~·s to an innocent purchaser. the cestai que
trust cannot disturb the title, but n1ust follmv the pro<'<'<'ds of sa]p in the hands of the trustee \Cole r. Thompson (C. C. \Y. Ya. 1909) 169 F. 129). LikPwise. in this case
t h<' pia inti fl's .are obliged, assu1ning the existence of the
purported trust. to sPPk their re1nedy against the de-

l':u·<'.
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fendant John J. Knop, inasmuch as title to the property
rests securely in the laps of defendants, Davis and Shumway.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the con1petent evidence of record is insufficient as .a matter of law to sustain the finding of the trial court that John J. Knop located the Faith Claims pur.suant to an express agreement
or an implied duty to do so in behalf of plaintiffs; that
John J. Knop, who conveyed title to the defendants,
D.avis and Shumway, was free to locate the subject mining claims in his own name and own behalf after the termination of the grubstake agreement; and, even assumjn~ that plaintiffs did sustain their burden with clear,
convincing, unequivocal .and definite evidence, still the
defendants, Davis and Shumway, took full and complete
title as bona fide purchasers for value and without
notice.

Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that this
Honorable Court should reverse the judgment of the
lower court, and should order that the defendants, Douglas J. Davis and Grant Shumway, have judgment against
plaintiffs for the following:
(a) That the Court decree that defendants, Douglas
J. Davis and Grant Shumway, are the owners of all right,
title and interest to the Inining claims, Faith numbers
1 through 10, and entitled to the possession of said property and the holding thereof.
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(b) That all other parties to this action be adjudged as having no estate, right, title or interest in said
mining claim_s, or any part thereof, and that they be forever debarred from asserting any estate, right, title or
interest of any nature in or to said property .adverse to
these defendants.
(c) That said defendants have and recover their.
costs of suit herein expended.

Respectfully submitted,

FOWLER & MATHESON
Counsel for Defetulants and
.AppeUants Douglas J. Davis
and Grant Shumway
628 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, L'tah
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